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Abstract. This Research Note presents a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from five regions.
The data was collected using the same methodology to compare patterns of patronage within countries,
across countries and across world regions that are usually studied separately. The Note addresses three
research questions that are at the centre of debates on party patronage, which is understood as the power
of political parties to make appointments to the public and semi-public sector: the scope of patronage, the
underlying motivations and the criteria on the basis of which appointees are selected.The exploration of the
dataset shows that party patronage is, to a different degree, widespread across all regions. The data further
shows differences between policy areas, types of institutions such as government ministries, agencies and
state-owned enterprises, and higher, middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy. It is demonstrated that the
political control of policy making and implementation is the most common motivation for making political
appointments. However, in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve the purpose of
both political control and rewarding supporters in exchange for votes and services. Finally, the data shows
that parties prefer to select appointees who are characterised by political and personal loyalty as well as
professional competence.
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Introduction
The exercise of political patronage within the state is an enduring phenomenon in the
political world and has received considerable scholarly attention.Why do patronage systems
emerge? Why does patronage differ between countries? Why is patronage a principal
method of staffing bureaucracies in one area of the state while elsewhere the state
institutions appear to be much stronger in resisting interference from (party) politicians?
A lively scholarly debate exists around these questions. Some authors emphasise the
role of historical legacies as the principal factor for the emergence and/or endurance of
patronage systems (Shefter 1994; Piattoni 2001), others focus on the structure of party
systems and political competition (Geddes 1994; O’Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007).
Numerous authors consider organisational and ideological characteristics of political parties
(Panebianco 1988; Kemahlioglu 2012; Cruz & Keefer 2015) to be the key drivers of
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patronage. There is also a rich literature on the politicisation of the civil service that
highlights the impact of administrative traditions, public management reform and the party
change in government (Peters & Pierre 2004; Lewis 2008; Painter & Peters 2010;Dahlström
& Niklasson 2013).
No matter what explanations are offered by scholars, however, most literature on
patronage politics points to the negative consequences of these practices. Contrary to
professional bureaucracies, patronage politics is typically regarded as an obstacle to
economic development; it promotes public sector corruption and lowers the capacity of
agencies to manage policy programmes (Evans & Rauch 1999; Lewis 2008; Bearfield 2009;
Dahlström et al. 2012;Nistotskaya & Cingolani 2015).Moreover, the literature dealing with
these questions highlights difficulties in reforming systems in which patronage has come to
play a large role in public service and in partisan politics (Geddes 1994; Grindle 2012). It is
for these reasons that patronage politics has received considerable attention among policy
makers and international organisations that seek to promote the professionalisation of the
state in transition and developing countries (Dimitrova 2002; Andrews 2013).
This Research Note adds to these debates by examining patterns of party patronage
in 22 countries from five regions. The dataset that is presented here is based on the same
methodology, providing a unique opportunity for the comparison of countries and regions
that are usually studied separately.The Note addresses three questions that are at the centre
of debates on party patronage, which we define as the power of political parties to make
appointments to the public and semi-public sector. First, it examines the scope of party
patronage – that is, the range of state institutions that is subject to political appointments and
the extent to which patronage reaches into state institutions (cf. ‘depth of patronage’). Our
dataset allows for the comparison of patronage across countries and regions as well aswithin
countries across types of institutions, policy areas and levels in institutional hierarchies. The
Research Note therefore presents a starting point for a more fine-grained understanding of
patronage practices around the world.
Second, the Note examines the motivation of parties and politicians for appointing
people to positions within the state, particularly, the distinction between political
appointments made for the sake of political ‘control’ as opposed to the ‘reward’ of political
supporters. Our dataset hence provides an empirical assessment of assumptions from large
parts of the comparative politics literature that refer to patronage as a form of clientelistic
politics for the reward of supporters in exchange for political services including electoral
support, on the one hand, and the common understandings in the comparative public
administration literature of political appointments as a management tool for the political
control of policy making and implementation, on the other.
Third, we examine in more detail the criteria that parties and politicians prioritise when
selecting personnel for political appointments. We focus on the selection on professional,
political and personal grounds in order to better understand whether key selection criteria
such as professional competence and political loyalty are complementary or mutually
exclusive.
Our chief empirical concern is to examine these three aspects of party patronage on a
cross-national and cross-regional basis. We also examine differences across policy domains
and types of institutions to identify patterns of patronage across regions and countries and
within countries. The analysis of this data yields an updated and comprehensive state of
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the art assessment in the field of party patronage in contemporary democracies. The Note
begins with a discussion of the concept of ‘party patronage’ and the methodology that was
employed when compiling the dataset. We then present the empirical results and conclude
with a discussion of avenues for future research.
Concepts, research design and methodology
The key concept that we employ in this ResearchNote is that of ‘party patronage’. In contrast
to most studies written in the tradition of particularistic politics, clientelism and corruption
(Scott 1969; Eisenstadt & Roninger 1980), we use a relatively narrow but also more precise
conception of party patronage, limiting the phenomenon to political appointments (Sorauf
1959;Wilson 1973;Kopecký et al. 2012).Unlike many other studies in the field of clientelism
and patronage politics that include various personal rewards and gifts, allocation of public
service projects, contracts or licenses,pork-barrel legislation and so on as forms of patronage,
this Note is exclusively concerned with the ability of political parties to appoint individuals
to (non-elective) positions in the public and semi-public sector, including posts in core civil
service, foreign embassies, state-owned companies, quangos or regulatory agencies, and the
practical exercise of this ability. In other words, our major empirical concern is to establish
how far political parties are in control of the allocation of public positions.
We therefore see party patronage as related but conceptually and empirically distinct
from both clientelism (i.e., exchange of benefits in order to secure votes) and corruption
(i.e., exchange of public decisions for private gain).1 At the same time, our understanding
of party patronage resonates with definitions of ‘civil service politicisation’ (e.g., Peters &
Pierre 2004), particularly those that focus on political appointments to positions that are
nominally within the scope of the professional civil service (Lewis 2008).
However, three caveats apply. First, party patronage in our conceptualisation includes
appointments where merit and professional qualifications – rather than partisan and
political criteria exclusively – may have been taken into account. Rather than excluding
merit or professional competence by definition, we empirically investigate the criteria
party politicians employ when making appointments. Second, party patronage in our
conceptualisation includes appointments of nonpartisan individuals. Our empirical interest
not only includes the appointments of party members, but rather all appointments in
which parties and their politicians play a meaningful role. However, the residual category
of non-patronage appointments remains meaningful. It includes, for instance, all public
appointments in the hands of the civil servants and various professions (doctors, judges,
etc.). The third caveat concerns the term ‘party patronage’. In practice, appointments made
by parties and individual politicians are hard to distinguish. Most appointments within
modern states are officially undertaken by individual politicians (usually ministers). In this
legal sense, party patronage rarely exists. A key question therefore is the extent to which
parties are involved in practice when ministers and other top executive politicians appoint:
Is the party the principal and the minister the agent, or vice versa? Strictly speaking, party
patronage should imply that the mechanisms of control within parties are sufficiently strong
for politicians, who occupy executive office in the name of the party, to merely appoint
whoever the party proposes. Yet in presidential democracies, in particular, individual party
politicians often appoint from within their own networks; the parties are relatively empty
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Table 1. Countries included in the dataset (with year of data collection)
Western Europe Eastern Europe Southern Europe Latin America Africa
Austria Bulgaria Greece Argentina Ghana
(2008–2010) (2007) (2009) (2007–2008) (2007)
Denmark Czech Republic Italy Dominican Republic South Africa
(2009) (2007) (2008) (2013) (2006)
Germany Hungary Portugal Paraguay
(2008–2010) (2008–2009) (2008–2009) (2012)
Iceland Romania Spain Uruguay
(2008) (2012–2013) (2008–2009) (2014)
Ireland
(2009)
Netherlands
(2009–2010)
Norway
(2009–2010)
United Kingdom
(2009)
organisational shells (Scherlis 2013).2 Our survey and complementary research provides a
tentative tool to distinguish these types of patronage politics.
With these caveats in mind, the dataset brings together data collected in independent
research projects in 22 countries from 2006 to 2014.3 All projects used the methodology
based on an expert survey developed by Kopecký et al. (2012). The 22 countries cover five
regions (see Table 1). This allows us to engage in a broader comparative analysis of party
patronage.
The survey comprised 947 experts; these were sampled through snowballing from,
principally, six groups: academia, the nongovernmental sector, donors, media, bureaucracy,
and political appointees and politicians. Experts were chosen for their knowledge of
patronage in nine policy areas in each country: the judiciary, economy, finance, foreign
service, healthcare, culture and education, military and police, media, and regional
government.4 Following Peters (1988), these nine areas were selected to cover a generic
model of the state.
The data provides patronage estimates for 179 policy areas in 22 countries. Each
policy area was further divided into three types of institutions: ministries, NDACs (non-
departmental agencies and commissions), and executing institutions (policy delivering and
commercial institutions, such as state-owned enterprises or embassies). In each country,
research teams utilised a common protocol to draw up a list of institutions falling under
these policy areas and institutional types.
Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with experts then provided quantitative
estimates and qualitative accounts of patronage. The interview protocol introduced and
defined the phenomenon studied, presented quantifiable response options and permitted
a qualitative discussion of the meaning and interpretation of each category to enhance
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measurement validity. Responses on closed-end questions were subsequently coded for use
in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) format.
Three common patronage indicators were estimated. The first – the Index of Party
Patronage (IPP) – was calculated by multiplying the median values for coded expert
estimates of the range and depth of patronage in each of the nine policy areas and three
institutional types. Range and depth of patronage were measured in separate questions.
Whether respondents believed party appointments happened in some (score = 1), most
(score = 2) or all (score = 3) institutions in the institutional arena and policy area
yielded the patronage range estimate; whether respondents believed party appointments
happen on the top managerial level (score = 1), middle level (score = 2) or lowest level
(score = 3) yielded the patronage depth estimate. Because of the ordinal nature of the data,
the median score as a measure of central tendency was used (Healey 1999: 78). The IPP was
subsequently aggregated to produce policy area and country estimates, standardised from 0
(no party politicisation of the state) to 1 (full party politicisation).To facilitate interpretation
of the Index, note that a value of 0.65 implies that parties appoint in most institutions at all
levels of the administration; a value of 0.4 that parties appoint in most institutions at top and
middle levels; and a value of 0.1 that parties appoint in a limited number of institutions at
only the top level.
The second indicator measures parties’ motivations for appointments. Following the
question ‘Why do parties appoint?’, it reports the proportion of respondents opting for
one of three answers: ‘reward to members and activists’, ‘control of various aspects of the
policy-making process and institutions’or ‘a combination of both reward and control’.5 These
answers were coded for each policy area within countries.
The third indicator captures the criteria prioritised by parties when appointing, thus
illuminating the characteristics of appointees. It does so by reporting the proportion of
respondents mentioning any of three criteria as explanations for being appointed to a state
position: professional background, political allegiance, or personal connections or other
criteria deemed relevant.6 Respondents could further opt for one or several selection criteria
allowing for the possibility that both political and professional considerations influence
appointments.
These three indicators improve upon existing studies in several ways. While precisely
measuring patronage as a phenomenon of covert politics is elusive (Müller 2000), the
indicators broaden the scope of patronage measurement by including ministries, agencies
and executing institutions alike, rather than only one type of state institution. Contrary
to other cross-country expert surveys (Dahlberg et al. 2013; Kitschelt 2014), they also
go beyond country-level data. This adds validity, as it takes into account within-country
variation of patronage across policy areas and institutions. In addition, an expert survey,
such as the one presented here, does not suffer from the validity limitations of proxy
indicators – such as personnel expenditures and state employment trajectories – employed
elsewhere (Calvo & Murillo 2004; O’Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007; Remmer 2007).
These indicators are often influenced by factors beyond the ability and likelihood of parties
to appoint and may thus not reflect patronage practices (Kopecký et al. 2012).
The expert survey also took an important duty of care to mitigate bias: at least four
experts were surveyed in each policy area,and,on average,roughly 43 semi-structured expert
interviews were conducted per country. Local research teams conducted all interviews in
C© 2016 European Consortium for Political Research
PARTY PATRONAGE IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 421
Figure 1. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by country.
person and provided further validation through contextual knowledge.Reliability tests were
conducted on parts of the data and indicated high consistency of the estimates. Potential
problems notwithstanding, we have no reason to doubt the reliability of our measures.
Confidence in the validity of our estimates as approximations of patronage is thus enhanced.
Finally, rather than basing inferences on assumptions about motivations and uses of party
patronage, the survey examines them empirically.
Patterns of party patronage in contemporary democracies
The Index of Party Patronage (IPP)
According to the expert survey,patronage is anything but a phenomenon of the past.With an
average IPP score of 0.43, parties appoint at top and middle levels in most state institutions
in the countries in the dataset. The 22 countries thereby differ starkly in the prevalence
of patronage, with IPP values from 0.09 in the United Kingdom to 0.98 in the Dominican
Republic (Figure 1).
The scope of party patronage varies not only across countries, but also across types of
institutions – albeit less so. The standard deviation of patronage scopes across institutional
types is roughly a third of cross-country deviation. When comparing the IPP across types
of institutions, ministries are found to register by far the highest patronage scope (0.54).
NDACs and executing institutions score substantially lower, at 0.39 and 0.36, respectively
(Figure 2).7 The greater politicisation of ministries holds across all regions covered in the
survey:Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Africa and Latin America.
Party patronage also varies across policy areas – albeit with only roughly 58 per cent of
the standard deviation of institutional types (Figure 3).8 Scholarly works examining intra-
country variation in state politicisation would thus do well to give greater prominence
to types of institutions, rather than solely cross-sector variation (Gingerich 2013). Across
policy areas, media (0.43) registers the highest average patronage scope. That parties
prioritise political control of public media may not surprise given its potential centrality
for re-election. Economy and health also come out with relatively higher patronage scores.
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Figure 2. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by institutional type.
Figure 3. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by policy area.
We could argue that health policy and economic policies such as industrial policy and
privatisation are high-risk areas for corruption and hence also with particular appeal for
party patronage. By contrast, finance (0.32), education and culture (0.32), and military
and police (0.33) score lowest. This finding is congruent with scholarly works pointing to
incentives to depoliticise public finances given its centrality in macroeconomic performance,
and the role of professional groups, such as teachers and policemen, as constituencies for
depoliticisation (Leonard 2010; Grindle 2012;Meyer-Sahling & Jager 2012).
Figure 4 shows that party patronage also varies across regions.9 Exploring such regional
variation is insightful not least for examining the extent towhich regional historical,political,
legal and cultural commonalities shape patronage patterns. The five regions covered in the
survey differ in legacies of pertinence for patronage, from patrimonalism and corporatism in
Latin America to British colonial institutions in parts of Africa, communist state legacies in
Eastern Europe, longstanding Weberian bureaucracies in Western Europe and clientelist
democratic legacies in Southern Europe, to name a few (see, among many, Fukuyama
2014). The dataset may, of course, not claim representativeness for all regions. While
European regions are well-covered,only four countries are sampled in Latin America.More
problematically, in Africa, the two countries included (Ghana and South Africa) share a
British colonial legacy and relatively successful democratisation episodes. These attributes
may make for less politicisation than in the remainder of Africa. This should be considered
when interpreting the data.
With this caveat in mind, the scope of patronage varies between 0.27 (Western Europe)
and 0.81 (LatinAmerica) across regions.EasternEurope (0.42),SouthernEurope (0.45) and
Africa (0.40) score roughly around the dataset average.Western European countries occupy
the five lowest positions in the IPP, while Latin American countries occupy four of the five
highest ranks. On average, patronage is restricted to the highest levels of state institutions
in Western Europe, while it permeates all levels of the hierarchy in the large majority of
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Figure 4. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by region.
state institutions in Latin America. This confirms evidence from qualitative studies pointing
to high state politicisation in Latin America, and relatively low politicisation in Western
Europe (Page &Wright 1999; Peters & Pierre 2004; Grindle 2012).
These patterns are insightful not least for scholars studying the determinants of
patronage. To illustrate this assertion, consider congruence of these patterns with just
two – of many hypothesised – key determinants: economic development and regional
legacies. With regard to the former, the cross-country data suggests that accounting for
politicisation solely through variation in economic development is not warranted (e.g.,
see Kitschelt and Kselman (2013) for a corresponding critique). Uruguay – with the least
patronage in Latin America in the dataset – is more politicised than Romania (0.48)
and Ghana (0.4) – the countries with the most patronage in Eastern Europe and Africa,
respectively. Yet, Uruguay’s gross national income (GNI) per capita is 68 per cent higher
than Romania’s and more than 8.5 times higher than Ghana’s (World Bank 2015).
Differential regional legacies appear more plausible at first sight. The standard deviation
of patronage across regions is twice that of patronage within regions. Yet region-specific
legacies by no means predetermine the scope of patronage. Significant intra-regional
differences remain: for example, patronage scopes range from 0.6 (Uruguay) to 0.98
(Dominican Republic) in Latin America; from 0.29 (Portugal) to 0.62 (Greece) in Southern
Europe; and from 0.09 (United Kingdom) to 0.49 (Austria) in Western Europe. Regional
legacies thus do not suffice to explain patronage patterns, either. Instead, multiple
concurrent causes are likely to produce the observed variation in party patronage.
Motivations for party patronage
As mentioned previously, two different motivations of (party) politicians to appoint within
the state are distinguished: a desire to control state institutions (e.g., in order to ensure
formulation and implementation of policies compatible with politician’s aims); and a desire
to reward party or politician’s supporters, activists or even friends and family (e.g., for their
electoral support or for their loyal service to the party). The distinction between different
motivations for patronage appointments is not only interesting in itself, but also underscores
two rather different general patterns of patronage politics: one which is clientelistic in nature
and where public jobs are used on a large scale as currency for purchasing votes, mobilising
grassroots activism and establishing loyal clienteles (Piattoni 2001; Kitschelt & Wilkinson
2007; Stokes et al. 2013); and one which is non-clientelistic and where public jobs are used
as a resource to exert control over, and establish presence within the state (Bearfield 2009;
Jalali & Lisi 2009; Kopecký et al. 2012).
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Figure 5. Party motivations (average across countries).
Figure 6. Motivations of party patronage by region.
As discussed above, the expert survey sought estimates on whether parties were
motivated by ‘control’, ‘reward’, ‘both’ or ‘other motivations’ when appointing. The
implication from the data is clear: across the 22 countries, patronage serves either solely
purposes of control of state institutions (43 per cent),or both control and reward for political
support (41 per cent) (Figure 5).This suggests that parties use patronage either principally as
a resource to control the state through networks of political appointees in state institutions,
or as a control and electoral resource – yet rarely solely as an electoral resource.10 Studies
equating patronage solely with ‘jobs for votes’ are therefore misguided.
This conclusion holds across regions. In no region or country is the traditional clientelist
conception of patronage as reward the most important category, although it is higher in
Latin America (11 per cent) than elsewhere. Patronage motivations across regions vary
principally in regards to whether ‘control’ or ‘control and reward’ are dominant. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, patronage is principally motivated by control in Western Europe. In Latin
America, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, by contrast, patronage serves as both a
control and an electoral resource (Figure 6).11
Characteristics of patronage appointees
Party patronage varies not only in scope and motivations, but also in the characteristics of
appointees.To explore this variation, the expert survey inquired about the criteria prioritised
by parties when appointing: professionalism, political allegiance or personal connections
(Figure 7). On average, professionalism is the most important criterion for selecting
appointees in the 22 countries sampled (84 per cent). This is followed by political allegiance
(70 per cent) and personal connections (62 per cent). Prima facie, this is welcome news: if
professionalism of appointees takes centre stage, the effect of patronage on organisational
performance in state bureaucracies is likely to be less pernicious (cf. Gallo & Lewis 2012).
The relatively high proportions for all three criteria, however, imply that parties typically
prioritise multiple criteria when appointing to the state. Party politicians thus frequently
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Figure 7. Qualifications of appointees (average across countries).
Figure 8. Qualifications of appointees by region.
select appointees who are, concurrently, professionally competent, loyal to the party and
personally connected to an individual in the party.
Moreover, the characteristics of appointees differ markedly across regions.
Professionalism trumps in Western and Southern Europe; political allegiance is central
in Eastern Europe and Latin America; and personal allegiance is prioritised in the two
African countries (Figure 8). With this in mind, the next section will explore associations
between the three distinct patronage dimensions in the dataset.
From jobs-for-votes to democratic responsiveness? Patronage prevalence
and the nature of patronage
To complement the analysis of patronage patterns, we examine associations between
patronage scopes, motivations and appointee qualifications. To our knowledge, this analysis
is a first in the literature. It sheds light on the extent to which the nature of patronage –
its motivations and the characteristics of appointees – evolves with changes in the extent
of patronage. Such an evolution is deductively intuitive. With a lower patronage scope,
the capacity of parties to appoint is curtailed. Control could then become more central:
parties need to ensure a responsive state apparatus with fewer appointees. Concurrently,
reward may become less valuable: elections are less likely to be won with (fewer available)
jobs-for-votes offers.With control-motivated patronage taking centre stage, we may expect
parties to seekmore professional appointees.Controlling state institutions is likely to require
more professional competence than electoral campaign support. If these expectations
are true, we might expect that the more limited the patronage scope, the more patronage
would revolve around assuring the democratic responsiveness of bureaucracy through
C© 2016 European Consortium for Political Research
426 PETR KOPECKÝ ET AL.
Table 2. Patronage scope and motivations: Country classification
Low Medium High
(0.00–0.29) (0.3–0.6) (0.61–1.00)
Control Denmark, United
Kingdom,
Norway
Ghana, South Africa,
Germany, Austria,
Czech Republic,
Hungary, Uruguay
Argentina
Control & Reward Portugal Iceland, Ireland, Spain,
Romania, Bulgaria*
Greece, Paraguay,
Dominican
Republic
Note: *Control and Control and Reward are equally important in Bulgaria.
Table 3. Patronage motivations and appointee qualifications: Country classification
Professional &
Professional political allegiance Political allegiance
(0.7) (0.7) (0.7)
Control United Kingdom,
Denmark, Norway,
South Africa, Ghana
Hungary, Czech
Republic, Argentina,
Germany, Austria
Control & Reward Iceland, Italy,
Netherlands
Portugal, Ireland, Spain,
Greece
Bulgaria, Romania
Paraguay, Dominican
Republic
professionally qualified appointees rather than the clientelist mobilisation of votes through
appointments of party members.
This analysis indicates that the expected relations are common, but several exceptions
are noteworthy. The first hypothesised association – between patronage scope and
motivations – is the most tenuous one. Countries are, as noted, split as to whether control or
control and reward is the principal patronage motivation. Per our expectation, patronage
scopes are negatively associated with ‘control’ (r = –0.20) and positively with ‘control
and reward’ (r = 0.45). Control is the dominant motivation in only one country with
high patronage (Argentina); and not the dominant motivation in only one country with
low patronage (Portugal) (Table 2). A negative association between patronage scope and
control-motivated patronage thus exists, yet is not deterministic. This is unsurprising. As in
Argentina’s central government, patronage may be extensive where it serves to secure state
control in contexts of weak formal control mechanisms and limited incumbent trust towards
public employees appointed by predecessors, for instance (Scherlis 2013).
As expected, control is also associated with more professional appointees:
professionalism trumps where patronage is principally motivated by control (Table 3).
Vice versa, however, professionalism also trumps in three countries (Iceland, Italy and
the Netherlands) in which patronage is principally motivated by control and reward
(Kopecký et al. 2012). While more ‘control and reward’ (rather than solely control)
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Table 4. Patronage scope and the qualifications of appointees: Country classification
Low Medium High
(0.0–0.3) (0.31–0.60) (0.61–1.00)
Professional (0.7) Denmark, United
Kingdom, Norway,
Netherlands
Iceland, Ghana,
South Africa, Italy
Professional &
political allegiance
(0.7)
Portugal Germany, Spain,
Austria, Czech
Republic,
Hungary, Ireland
Greece, Acrgentina
Political allegiance
(0.7)
Bulgaria, Romania Paraguay, Dominican
Republic
motivated patronage is thus negatively associated with professionalism (r = –0.49); and
positively associated with political allegiance (r = 0.45), this association is, once again, not
deterministic.
In accordance with our theoretical expectations, appointees are also less professional
(r = –0.54) and more politically allegiant (r = 0.52) where the scope of patronage is
greater. Outliers are less present in this association. Where the scope of patronage is
limited, professionalism trumps; where patronage is pervasive, political allegiance takes
centre stage (Table 4). Patronage thus prioritises professionalism where it is limited, and
political allegiance where it is extensive.
The nature of patronage thus tends to evolve with its scope. Where patronage is
extensive, it prioritises political allegiance of appointees and is motivated by control of state
institutions and reward for political support. In other words, it serves parties as a resource to
gain electoral support and control the state through the embedment of a network of party
political appointees. In contrast, where patronage is limited, it typically revolves around
control of state institutions through professional appointees. Outliers exist, however, as
exemplified by Argentina and Portugal.While the scope,motivation and focus of appointee
qualifications therefore tend to be closely related, the exceptions indicate that the relation
between dimensions of patronage remains an empirical question worthy of exploration.
Conclusion
This Research Note has presented a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from
five regions. The data was collected based on the same methodology and provides a
unique opportunity to compare patterns of patronage across countries and regions that are
typically studied separately. The exploration of the dataset has shown that party patronage
is widespread across all regions includingWestern Europe.Regional differences are evident.
Latin America especially stands out with a higher scope of party patronage.The data further
shows that patronage is particularly relevant for central government ministries, which are
located closer to the centres of political power.Agencies and other non-ministerial bodies as
well as executing institutions such as state-owned enterprises, hospitals, universities and the
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police are relatively less exposed to political appointments. This pattern has been shown to
be consistent across all five regions covered in the Research Note.There is also considerable
evidence that patronage is more common in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy.Themiddle
and lower ranks are mainly subject to political appointments in countries with a high scope
of patronage, indicating that patronage creeps down institutional hierarchies rather than
upwards.
Our data has further indicated that the control of policy making and implementation
is the most common motivation for making political appointments. This appears to be
especially true for the low patronage cases ofWestern Europe.By contrast, in countries with
a large scope of patronage, appointments serve both as a control and a reward function.Our
data hence indicates that the clientelistic understanding of party patronage as an electoral
resource remains important. However, it also suggests that it is unusual to find settings
in which appointments are exclusively made for the sake of rewarding party affiliates in
exchange for political services and support.
Finally, the exploration of the dataset showed consistently that parties prefer to
appoint, on average, politically and personally loyal professionals. In other words, it is
problematic to assume a simple dichotomy between political and professional appointments,
as politicians appear to be interested in both professional competence and political loyalty.
However, the extent to which different selection criteria are applied remains an empirical
question.
The main purpose of this Research Note has been the presentation of a cross-regional
dataset on patterns of party patronage; the first of its kind. Yet the data provides a
number of opportunities for further research. First, the cross-regional dataset increases
the number of observations at the country level. It further increases the variation in the
scope of patronage and for the study of other dimensions of patronage captured by the
dataset.
Second, the cross-regional dataset yields new opportunities for the explanation of
patronage politics. For instance, a cross-regional perspective allows for a comprehensive
assessment of the impact of parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential regimes on
party patronage, which is not possible in research that focuses on one region only. Similarly,
governance in Latin America, Africa and the European regions is subject to very different
forms of international influence that will allow for a better understanding of party patronage.
Third, while cross-regional differences were evident, the exploration of the dataset has
confirmed the importance of intra-regional variation in patronage politics.This suggests that
determinants well known from the literature such as administrative traditions, the structure
of political competition, the type of political parties – to name but a few prominent ones –
are indeed essential for the explanation of variation in party patronage.
Finally, the dataset provides new avenues for the within-country analysis of patronage.
Indeed, the data points towards important differences across policy areas, types of
institutions and organisational hierarchies. Both domestic and international factors are
likely to be relevant here. For instance, the globalisation of markets might have put
pressure on governments to insulate, at least partially, the management of the economy
and public finances from political interference. In the literature on the political economy of
development in Latin America, these patterns are commonly discussed under the heading
of ‘pockets of effectiveness’ (Leonard 2010; Bersch et al. 2013). By contrast, ‘islands of
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excellence’ in Central and Eastern Europe have been linked to the EU accession process
(Goetz 2001; Meyer-Sahling & Van Stolk 2015). A cross-regional perspective therefore
opens new agendas for research as much as it presents an invitation for further research
on party patronage around the world.
Notes
1. For a more detailed discussion on the differences between patronage, clientelism and corruption, see
Piattoni (2001) and Kopecký et al. (2012).
2. This applies especially to contemporary Argentina and many other presidential systems in Latin
America. However, it is recognised that parties have relatively more organisational resources in some
presidential systems such as Chile.
3. The data can be obtained from the authors upon request. For Romanian data, see Volintiru (2015).
4. Depending on the territorial structure of the state, the regional government category included the state
level, provincial level or regional level of public administration in the countries under study. It did not
include the local government level.
5. The full text of the question reads: ‘In your opinion, why do political parties actually appoint people to
these jobs? Are they interested in rewarding their loyal party activists and members with state jobs or
do they want to control these sectors and institutions by having personnel linked to the party appointed
in them?’
6. The full text of the question reads: ‘Now, we want to ask you a question about the people appointed
by political parties to these positions. Would you say that they have gotten their jobs because they
are professionally qualified for them, or because of their political link, or because of their personal
allegiance, or any other allegiance?’
7. Note that the data does not differentiate between NDACs and executing institutions in the cases of
Uruguay, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. The conclusions are not affected by this conflation.
8. Figure 3 only includes countries with data for the eight policy areas included in the figure. Germany,
Paraguay, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic are thus excluded.
9. The regional classification is but one of many potential country classifications. For space limitations,
others are not explored.Other scholars may use the data to examine other analytically pertinent country
classifications, such as waves of democratisation, income or human development.
10. Note, however, that, for our interviewees ‘control of state institutions’ meant slightly different
things. Meanings ranged from control of policy making and implementation to control of political
content/media coverage and over possibilities for building clientelistic and corrupt networks in the state.
Yet these different interpretations all stress the benefit patronage appointments bring to the appointing
agent – the party – as opposed to the appointee, which is captured by the reward motivation.
11. InAfrica, control is the dominantmotivation.Asmentioned previously, this may,however,be an artefact
of case selection.
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